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Abstract 
We investigate the relationship between insider trading and stock returns in firms with 
concentrated ownership. To this end, we employ data from East Asian countries which span 
the period 2003:01-2012:05. Consistent with previous literature, we find a significantly 
negative relation between the selling activity of insiders and stock returns. However, contrary 
to studies which focus on highly developed markets, we find that the buying activity of 
insiders is also inversely related to future stock returns. Our analysis shows that top directors 
with higher ownership levels drive this result, suggesting that the trading activity of insiders 
is not always associated with profit making motives and can be explained by their level of 
ownership. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a trading strategy which focuses solely on 
purchases made by top directors with high ownership levels yields negative returns. The 
paper has important implications for outside investors who mimic the trading activity of  
insiders with the aim to realise profits. 
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1. Introduction 
A rich literature on insiders’ trading shows that insiders can earn abnormal returns through 
trading stocks of their own firms (Lin and Howe, 1990; Seyhun, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1998; 
Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; 
Marin and Olivier, 2008; Gangopahyay et al., 2009; Jiang and Zaman, 2010). Outsiders can 
also profit by mimicking the insiders’ transactions (Jaffe, 1974; Tavakoli et al., 2012). 
However, the extant literature mainly focuses on firms in highly developed capital markets 
where ownership is diffuse and insiders hold only a small fraction of the firm’s equity. As a 
result, we know less about firms where insiders are also large shareholders, which could 
create different motives for trading. To fill this gap in the literature, we explore the link 
between insiders’ trading activity and future stock returns. Our findings should enable us to 
assess whether previous results in markets where ownership is diffuse also hold in countries 
with more concentrated ownership. Additionally, they will allow us to assess whether 
investors can make profits by mimicking the trading activity of insiders with different levels 
of ownership.  
 To address these issues, we employ data from a number of countries where firms are 
characterised by higher ownership concentration. In particular, our dataset includes China, 
Hong Kong, India, Singapore, and Taiwan and spans the period from 2003:01 to 2012:05. It 
is well documented that, unlike the US for example, most corporations in East Asia have 
concentrated ownership structures (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and 
Lang, 2002). With more concentrated ownership of the firm’s equity, insiders have the 
incentive and power to take actions that benefit themselves at the expense of the firm’s 
performance and thus at the expense of outside shareholders (see, e.g., Fama and Jensen, 
1985). On the other hand, more concentrated ownership in the hands of insiders can 
ameliorate the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. Specifically, as their 
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stakes in the company increase, managers pay a larger share of the costs of deviation from 
value maximisation and therefore they are less likely to squander corporate wealth (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Hence, it could be argued that the trading activity of insiders with high 
levels of ownership, such as the ones considered in our paper, may not always be driven by 
the pursuit of profit based on private information but it could also be associated with other 
motives. For instance, they might want to support the price of their own firm’s shares, which 
may be used in other dealings as collateral, through buying transactions or they could be 
making a market for their firms’ shares if traded in relatively thin markets (Firth et al., 2011). 
Alternatively, insiders’ buying activity may serve as a signal of the quality of their company 
to outside shareholders (Leland and Pyle, 1977). An important implication of the above and 
also one of the motivations of our paper is that outside investors who try to mimic the trading 
behaviour of insiders with high fractions of ownership may not always manage to gain profits 
compared to investors in the US and other highly developed markets.  
Our contributions to the literature in relation to the above issues are as follows. First, 
although we confirm much of the previous literature by finding a significantly negative 
relation between the selling activity of insiders and future stock returns (e.g., Seyhun, 1986), 
we show that the relation between their buying activity and future stock returns is also 
negative. This is a new finding in East Asian markets which is in sharp contrast to studies 
which focus on the US or on European markets (e.g., Lin and Howe, 1990; Gregory et al., 
1997; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) and suggests that there could be other motives when 
insiders acquire shares. In particular, this could be explained by the high level of ownership 
which typically characterises the firms in the countries of our sample. To investigate the 
issue, we split directors into two groups, (i) the top directors comprised of the CEO and the 
Chairman of the firm, and (ii) the rest of the directors. Interestingly, we indeed find that the 
negative relationship between stock returns and buying activity is related to top managent and 
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we further demonstrate that top managers with higher ownership levels drive this result. 
Therefore, our paper posits the view that the buying activity of insiders in firms where they 
possess high levels of ownership can be associated with reasons other than timing the market 
in order to realise profits. For example, they could aim at supporting their own firm’s share 
price or they could make a market for the shares of their firm. Within this context, our study 
offers fresh empirical evidence on an important issue while at the same time it complements a 
smaller body of literature which focuses on firms characterised by concentrated ownership 
levels (e.g., Wong et al., 2000; Firth et al., 2011).    
Second, we provide results of economic value which are in line with our statistical 
analysis and have important implications for outside investors. Specifically, we show that a 
trading strategy that focuses solely on purchases made by top directors with low ownership 
levels yields high positive returns. However, our analysis reveals that a similar strategy which 
follows the buying activity of insiders with high ownership levels generates negative returns. 
We additionally show that the difference between risk-adjusted returns based on the Sharpe 
ratios obtained from the two different strategies, is statistically significant. For a more 
comprehensive analysis, we calculate the corresponding risk-adjusted portfolio returns 
(alphas) for the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, and Carhart four-factor model and 
our results remain unaltered. In light of this interesting finding, our paper suggests that 
investors who try to mimic the buying activity of insiders should be cautious as insiders may 
have different motives depending on their level of ownership. Finally, we additionally 
provide a series of robustness checks in relation to sample selectivity, unobserved 
institutional characteristics and alternative explanations, and our main conclusions remain  
unaffected. 
Overall, this paper provides some fresh evidence and empirically demonstrates that 
the trading activity of insiders is not always associated with the same motives as these can be 
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explained by the different levels of ownership and do not aim at making profits in all 
instances. Consequently, outside investors who want to time the market and  make a profit for 
themselves, should be aware of these issues when formulating trading strategies. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
employed in this study and offers some summary statistics, Section 3 provides the 
methodological approach and discusses the empirical findings, and Section 4 concludes the 
study. 
 
2. Data  
2.1 Regulatory background 
Our study employs insider trading data derived from the stock markets of China, Hong Kong, 
India, Singapore and Taiwan. As stated from China Securities Regulatory Commission, a 
director or senior management officer of a listed company shall notify the listed company and 
the listed company shall announce on the website of the Stock Exchange any change of the 
shares in the company held by such investor within two days of actual occurrence of the 
change. The announcement shall include the number of shares held before and after the 
change as well as the date and the price at which they were acquired or disposed. In Hong 
Kong, directors are also required to report changes in shareholding interests to the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong within five working days (see, e.g., Cheuk et al., 2006). Similar 
disclosure requirements are imposed by the respective securities commissions in the 
remaining markets of our sample. Therefore, these regulations allow us to investigate whether 
outside investors can formulate profitable trading strategies based on the trading activity of 
insiders.   
2.2 Data description 
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Insider trading data in this paper are compiled from DataStream (Thomson Reuters), Asian 
Insider Transaction/Holdings Feed, covering the period from January 2003 to May 2012. This 
period covers the recent financial crisis that affected markets throughout the world. The 
database contains records of more than 400,000 insider transactions of which more than 
140,000 are classified as direct transactions in 7,203 firms (issuers) that trade on the stock 
markets of China, Hong Kong, India, Singapore and Taiwan. The data are aggregated to the 
monthly frequency and in line with the standard approach in the literature we focus on open-
market purchases and sales of shares (see, e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Iqbal and Shetty, 
2002; Cohen et al., 2012). Moreover, following Conrad and Kaul (1993) and Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001), we exclude share grants, transfers, option exercises, non-common shares, 
depository receipts, closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts, convertible debt, 
exchange notes and stock options from our analysis. Finally, in line with prior studies (e.g., 
McMillan et al., 2014), firms with less than 12 (not necessarily consecutive) months of 
transactions are also excluded. 
We merge our insider transactions data with financial firm-level data from 
DataStream using CUSIP. Firms are excluded from our sample if they do not have share price 
information. Of the 7,203 firms in our original dataset, 6,551 firms have enough information 
regarding valid matching CUSIP codes and firm sizes over the sample period. Furthermore, 
to filter out potential recording errors embedded in DataStream we follow Ince and Porter 
(2006) and Andriosopoulos et al. (2014) and we apply a similar screening procedure to stock 
returns.1  Monthly stock returns are computed as 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = log(𝑃𝑖,𝑡) − log⁡(𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) , where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 
denotes the closing stock price of firm i at time t. 
The asset pricing literature finds significant cross-sectional predictability in stock 
                                                          
1 Returns for months t and t-1 are set to missing if (1+Rt)(1+Rt-1)-1<50%, where Rt is the return for month t, and 
at least one of the two returns is greater than 300% (see also Lee, 2010). 
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returns based on firm characteristics including beta, dividend yield, price-earnings ratio, and 
book-to-market ratio which are correlated with a firm’s subsequent stock returns (see, e.g., 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1982; Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Fama and French, 1992). 
Therefore, in addition to insider trading activity we also include the dividend yield, size, 
book-to-market ratio, the company’s beta, and the debt-to-total assets ratio in our analysis. 
Given that recent evidence suggests that U.S. stock returns have significant explanatory 
power for non-U.S. market returns (see, Rapach et al., 2013), we also control for the returns 
on the S&P 500 index. This allows us to examine whether the insider trading information has 
predictive power over and above information that would be publicly available. Finally, we 
also account for the potential impact of the recent global financial crisis by incorporating into 
our model the Crisis dummy variable that takes the value of one from September 2007 
onwards and zero otherwise. 
2.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows the number of firms with insider trading and the number and volume of insider 
transactions across all five countries. The ratio of the number of insider transaction purchases 
to insider sales ranges from 2.57 for Taiwan to 8.11 for Singapore for all directors, while the 
range of this ratio for the top directors is slightly tighter across the countries. With respect to 
the ratio of the volume of insider transaction purchases to insider sales, this ranges from just 
2.78 for Hong Kong to 22.86 for China, while the range of the same ratio for top directors is 
slightly wider. These results are in line with other studies (Cheuk et al., 2006; Firth et al., 
2011) and show that both the number and volume of insider purchases in these countries are 
much greater than their respective insider sales as compared to US transactions where 
insiders are, on average, sellers (Seyhun, 1998; Jeng et al., 2003; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010; 
Tavakoli et al., 2012). One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that, unlike the U.S., 
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equity-based remuneration is not as popular in East Asia and this could lead to relatively less 
insider selling for portfolio rebalancing following stock or option grants.   
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
In general, our data sample suggests that directors are heavy traders both in terms of 
number of transactions and volume of trading and buy far more than they sell. Directors in 
East Asia may sell relatively less frequently for a number of reasons. These could include 
making a market for their firms’ share with the aim of maintaining their values used as 
collaterals in other financial dealings, to provide liquidity for their firm’s shares or to send a 
positive signal about the future prospects of their firm to the market. However, if directors do 
sell, apart from personal liquidity needs, this could convey a negative signal regarding the 
future performance of their companies to the market.  
 
3. Methodology and Results 
3.1 Stock returns and insiders’ trading activity: predictive regressions 
Initially, we employ regressions of one-month-ahead stock returns on the directors’ trading 
activity. There is an abundance of evidence in the extant literature which suggests that 
insiders can earn abnormal returns through buying (selling) shares of their own firm (e.g., 
Seyhun, 1990, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Based on this evidence we expect the 
relation between one-month-ahead stock returns and directors’ buying (selling) activity to be 
positive (negative). To better capture trading activity (either buying or selling), we consider 
the volume of shares and we run pooled regressions with standard errors clustered both at the 
firm and country level.2 Specifically, we estimate the following predictive regression:3 
                                                          
2 Our results are robust to the use of dollar weighted insiders’ buying (selling) activity.  
9 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +𝑀𝑡 + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,      (1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes the return on stock i at time t, and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the insiders’ trading 
activity, which could be either buys or sells. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 denotes a vector of controlling variables that 
have been shown to have predictive power for stock returns, namely size, book-to-market 
ratio, dividend yield, firm’s riskiness as measured by its beta, and the return on the S&P 500 
index. The model also includes month dummies, 𝑀𝑡, to capture time effects common to all 
firms, as well as country specific fixed effects, 𝐶𝑖 , to control for unobserved country 
heterogeneity. Finally, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is a stochastic error term. The null hypothesis of no predictability, 
in terms of insiders’ activity, is that 𝑏 is zero in equation (1), while the alternative hypothesis 
of predictability predicates that 𝑏 ≠ 0. The results are presented in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Columns 1-3 of Table 2 illustrate that both buying and selling activity are strong 
predictors of future stock returns. In line with much of the previous literature, we find that 
selling activity predicts lower future returns (significant at the 1% level, see column 3). On 
the other hand, the relation between buying activity and future returns is also negative 
suggesting that insiders on average incur a loss throughout the sample period which amounts 
to 1.3 basis points for every million of shares bought. This result is in sharp contrast to 
previous studies which suggest that insiders should be able to earn positive profits when 
using their informational advantage. This is an interesting finding in East Asian markets 
which leads to the question of why the relation between buying activity and future returns 
follows a different pattern compared to, for instance, the US market. To further explore this 
issue and to identify what drives this result, we decompose our sample into CEOs and Chairs, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 A number of studies in the return predictability literature focus on the spurious evidence of predictability 
which can arise as a result of highly persistent predictive variables (see, inter alia, Nelson and Kim, 1993; 
Stambaugh, 1999; Amihud and Hurvich, 2004; Philips and Lee, 2013). However, our inferences are not affected 
by such concerns given that the predictive variables employed in our paper are far from being persistent. 
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and other directors and re-examine the aforementioned relation. The results are presented in 
Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
As can be seen from this table, the negative relation between buying activity and 
future returns in East Asian countries is associated with the top directors (i.e. CEOs and 
Chairs). Specifically, both CEOs and Chairs have a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient, whereas the rest of the directors’ buying activity predicts positive future returns. 
Furthermore, we find that the difference in the coefficients on buying activity between the 
CEOs (Chairs) and the rest of the directors is 24 (48) basis points and statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  As shown in column 2, these results are robust when we also control for the 
directors’ selling activity in the model.4 Based on the above findings, it appears that there is a 
distinctive difference between top management and the rest of directors regarding their ability 
to time the market. This is particularly interesting given that top directors should have access 
to at least the same information as the rest of the directors and hence, they should be able to 
exploit it for their own benefit. Therefore, we posit the view that there might be other reasons 
behind their buying activity which are not related to market timing. For instance, a plausible 
explanation could be that top directors in East Asian markets might buy their own firms’ 
shares to support their price with the aim to achieve beneficial results in the long-run or to 
make a market for their firms’ shares. This could indeed be the case given that compared to 
firms in the US for example, firms incorporated in the countries included in our sample have 
a less diffuse ownership and in some cases they can even be family owned.  
                                                          
4 As is evident from Table 1, Hong Kong comprises a large fraction of our sample. The context here is relevant 
to the study of Brochet (2017) which involves a similar issue. Following Brochet (2017), we conduct an 
empirical analysis excluding Hong Kong from our sample and we find that the negative relationship between the 
buying activity of top directors and stock returns remains robust to this exclusion. Therefore, our main 
inferences are not driven by Hong Kong.  
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To further investigate this issue and in line with our proposition, we consider the top 
directors’ ownership levels and explore whether these indeed play an important role in this 
context conditioned on the number of shares acquired. The relevant model is expressed as: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +𝑀𝑡 + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,     (2) 
where 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 denotes the top directors’ buying activity in firm i at time t and 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡  is the 
ownership level of the top directors in firm i at time t. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  denotes the vector of control 
variables, while 𝑀𝑡 and 𝐶𝑖, respectively, denote month and country fixed effects, as described 
in equation (1). The results are tabulated in Table 4. 
 [Insert Table 4 around here] 
Looking at column 1 in Table 4, we observe that there is a negative relation between 
future returns and the level of ownership conditional on the number of shares acquired. 
However, the corresponding interaction term is based on all buying activity from top 
directors and does not distinguish between different motives. For instances, given a negative 
firm’s past market performance top directors with high ownership levels are more likely to 
initiate a price support purchase. Based on this notion, we estimate another interaction model 
to obtain the relation between the next month’s returns and top directors' ownership levels 
conditioned on the firm’s past market performance and number of shares acquired. In 
particular, we capture the firms’ past performance using a dummy variable (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡) that 
takes the value of one if the return in the previous period is negative, and zero otherwise. The 
corresponding model can be expressed as follows: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏3𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏4𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 +
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑏5𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏6𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡 +𝑀𝑡 +
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐶𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,   
(3) 
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The results presented in column 2 suggest that ownership levels are negatively associated 
with future returns and they are also statistically significant. This finding indicates that the 
top directors’ buying activity is not always associated with market timing. It could also be 
motivated by other factors such as price support which could result in insiders realising 
negative returns. To explore this further, we turn our attention to firms' fundamentals. 
Specifically, we investigate whether the reported negative relation between future returns and 
the level of ownership still holds under the scenario where firms' fundamentals, as captured 
by either the earnings growth or the dividend growth, are strengthened.  If this were the case, 
it would imply that top managers with high ownership levels are motivated by price support 
so as to signal to the market that their firms are currently undervalued. To this end, we 
introduce 𝐸𝐺𝐷𝑖,𝑡 (𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑖,𝑡), a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s earnings 
growth (dividend growth) is positive in the previous quarter, and zero otherwise. 
Subsequently, we extend with this variable the interaction terms used in Equation (3). The 
corresponding results are tabulated in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5. We find that the estimated 
coefficients of the new interaction terms are both negative and statistically significant which 
is in line with the notion of price support from top directors.   
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
On the other hand, there might be additional factors, not necessarily mutually 
exclusive to price support that could determine the buying activity of top directors with high 
ownership levels and explain our findings. Such factor could be the thin trading of shares 
which is linked to higher price volatility (see, Pagano, 1989) and could result in a higher cost 
of equity (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). To explore this aspect in our analysis, we construct a 
dummy variable (𝑇𝑉𝐷𝑖,𝑡) that takes the value of one if the trading volume of a firm is lower 
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than the average trading volume of the previous twelve months and zero otherwise. 5 
Subsequently, we re-estimate Equation (3) interacted with this variable. The results are 
tabulated in column 3 of Table 5. We find that the coefficient of interest is statistically 
insignificant. This finding implies that the motives behind the buying activity of top directors 
within our sample are more likely to be linked to price support rather than to the thinness of 
the market. 
 
3.2 Portfolio returns 
In this section we analyse the returns of two portfolios formed based on top directors with 
high ownership levels and top directors with low ownership levels in the company. This 
analysis complements our previous findings and provides a further robustness check, whereas 
it is also of interest to investors. Specifically, we consider an investor who goes long on firms 
with negative past market performance when their top directors have high ownership levels 
and show buying activity. When there is no buying activity the investor goes long on the risk-
free asset. We also consider a second investor under the same setup with the only difference 
being that she tracks the buying activity of top directors with low ownership levels. We report 
only the value-weighted results in this study.6  
 Apart from reporting the raw returns, we also employ Sharpe ratios and further adjust 
the portfolio returns on the basis of common risk factors. Fama and French (1996) show that 
their three-factor model can explain most commonly documented Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) anomalies except for the momentum anomaly. For each portfolio i, the 
abnormal return in excess of the Fama-French three-factor model is captured by the intercept 
in the following regression model: 
                                                          
5 Results are similar if the trading volume of the previous month is used instead. 
6 We have also run our tests based on equally-weighted portfolio returns and our results are qualitatively similar. 
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 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,     (4) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the return on portfolio i in excess of the risk-free rate in month t, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −
𝑅𝑓,𝑡  is the excess return on the market value-weighted portfolio, SMB is the return 
differential between portfolios of small and large stocks, and HML is the spread in the returns 
between portfolios of value (high book-to-market ratio) and growth (low book-to-market 
ratio) stocks. Thus, the factors SMB and HML represent the size and value premia, 
respectively. 
 Since the Fama-French three-factor model does not capture the momentum effect, 
Carhart (1997) suggests adding a fourth factor (WML) that is based on the returns of a 
diversified portfolio going long on recent winners and short on recent losers which captures 
momentum in the three-factor model. For each portfolio i, the abnormal return in excess of 
the four-factor model is captured by the intercept in the following regression: 
  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,   (5) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the return on portfolio i in excess of the risk-free rate in month t, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 −
𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the excess return on the market value-weighted portfolio, SMB is the size factor, HML 
is the value factor, and WML is the momentum factor.  
 The corresponding results in Table 6 show that a trading strategy focusing solely on 
purchases made by top directors with low ownership levels earns large positive returns, while 
a strategy that follows the purchases of top directors with high ownership levels does not. For 
example, the low ownership portfolio earns 1.96% per month, which combined with a 
standard deviation of 13.24% leads to a Sharpe ratio of 0.147, whereas the high ownership 
portfolio generates -0.88 % per month and yields a Sharpe ratio of -0.122%.  
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Following Ledoit and Wolf (2008), we also test the null hypothesis that the 
corresponding Sharpe ratios of high and low ownership portfolios are equal by considering 
the difference between Sharpe ratios:  
𝛥𝑆𝑅 = 𝑆𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑆𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ ,        (6) 
where 𝑆𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤 denotes the Sharpe ratio of the low ownership portfolio and 𝑆𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ denotes the 
Sharpe ratio of the high ownership portfolio. The test statistic by Ledoit and Wolf (2008) uses 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and is asymptotically 
distributed as a standard normal random variable.   
 The estimated Ledoit and Wolf (2008) test statistic tabulated in Table 6, with a two-
sided p-value of 0.001, suggests that the Sharpe ratio produced from the low ownership 
portfolio is statistically different to the one from the high ownership portfolio. This finding 
indicates that the risk-adjusted return generated by investing in firms with negative past 
market performance when their top directors with low levels of ownership show buying 
activity, is significantly higher than the corresponding risk-adjusted return produced by 
investing in firms where the top directors with high ownership are buying shares. The risk-
adjusted portfolio returns (alphas) for the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, and 
Carhart four-factor model reveal a similar pattern and corroborate the previous results. In this 
case, a portfolio strategy that goes long on low ownership buys and short on high ownership 
buys earns a four-factor alpha of 250 basis points per month (t =2.25), or over 30% per year.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
Overall, our findings in this section indicate that top directors do not always act with 
the aim to time the market, but there could be alternative reasons such as price support that 
motivates them to buy shares of their own firm, especially when they have a high stake in the 
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firm (i.e. a high ownership level). Therefore, investors in these markets should consider the 
ownership level of top directors when trying to mimic their trading activity.       
 
4. Robustness checks  
This section provides further empirical evidence by means of additional robustness checks in 
relation to issues of sample selectivity and institutional characteristics.7 
4.1 Sample selectivity checks  
One of the main findings of this study is the negative relation between insiders’ buying 
activity and future stock returns. As mentioned above, this is a new finding in East Asian 
markets which is in sharp contrast to studies that focus on the US or on European markets. 
One factor that could drive this result is the recent global financial crisis. If the decline in 
stock market prices that occurred during this period was coupled by increased insider 
purchasing activity, then the negative relation between insider trading and future stock 
returns could be the outcome of this subperiod.  
To examine such sample selectivity and alleviate any concern, we re-estimate column 
3 of Table 2 by incorporating the interaction of InsideTradeBuy and InsideTradeSell with the 
recent global financial crisis. For a more comprehensive analysis, we divide the crisis into 
two periods. The first period spans September 2007 (the Northern Rock bank run) to August 
2008 and the second period spans September 2008 (the Lehman Brothers collapse) to January 
2009. We then interact the corresponding dummy variables with InsiderTradeBuy 
(InsiderTradeSell). The results, reported in Panel A of Table 7, suggest that our previous 
findings remain robust to the inclusion of these interaction terms and the relation between the 
                                                          
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these robustness checks. 
17 
 
buying activity of directors and future stock returns is still negative and significant during 
both calm and turmoil periods. 
As an additional robustness check regarding sample selectivity, we explore whether 
the negative relation between insiders’ buying activity and future stock returns is driven by 
large or small firms. To address this issue, we initially classify firms that belong to the lower 
tertile (in terms of size) of our sample as small, while those that belong to the top tertile are 
classified as large. We then re-estimate column 3 of Table 2 with respect to both small and 
large firms. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 7. Consistent with our previous 
results, we find a negative and significant relation (at the 1% level) between the buying 
activity and future returns with respect to both types of firms. This suggests that our previous 
findings are not driven by firm size. 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
 
4.2 Other checks 
As shown in our main analysis, the negative relation between the insiders’ buying activity 
and future stock returns is explained by the trading activity of top directors with high 
ownership levels. However, each of the five countries studied may reflect differences or 
variation in their institutional characteristics which are not related to high ownership levels 
and could produce a similar result. To address this concern, we re-estimate column 2 of Table 
4 including month-country fixed effects to capture any time varying institutional 
characteristics. The corresponding results are tabulated in Table 8 and indicate that our 
previous findings remain robust to this specification.  
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
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Moreover, we explore another angle which might shed more light on the motives of 
insider trading and is related to blackout periods. Blackout periods, during which insiders 
have an even greater informational advantage, constitute a mechanism that firms and/or 
regulators use to restrain informed insider trading (Bettis et al., 2000). Within this context, we 
aim to investigate whether insiders exploit the additional information they possess to make a 
profit. To this end, we assume that a blackout period is enforced in the month preceding 
earnings announcements and we create a relevant dummy (Blackout) that captures this.8 
Subsequently, we re-estimate Equations (1) and (3) for the different periods (i.e. blackout vs 
non-blackout). The corresponding results are tabulated in Table 9.  
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
Looking at column 1, the coefficients on the interaction terms of CEO and Chair with 
the Blackout dummy variable are positive and statistically significant (at the 10% and 1% 
level, respectively), whereas the coefficient on the interaction term between the rest of the 
directors and the blackout dummy is statistically insignificant. These results indicate that the 
buying activity of top directors is more profitable during blackout periods relative to non-
blackout periods, while the rest of directors experience the same profitability over the full 
period. Therefore, the purchases of top directors in the month prior to earnings 
announcements are more likely to be information driven rather than motivated by other 
considerations. However, when we condition top directors’ buying activity on their 
ownership levels and firm’s past market performance the coefficient of interest is negative 
and highly significant (see column 2). This finding suggests that top directors with high 
stakes in the firm are more likely to initiate a price support purchase rather than time the 
market when their firm faces a declining share price. 
 
                                                          
8 In our sample, the average percentage of trades in the month before earnings announcements is 11.6%. 
19 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relation between stock returns and the trading activity of insiders 
in firms with high ownership concentration. To this end, we employ data from countries with 
this characteristic in firm ownership which include China, Hong Kong, India, Singapore, and 
Taiwan and cover the period from 2003:01 to 2012:05. Our paper complements the extant 
literature which mainly focuses on firms in highly developed markets where ownership is 
diffuse, by providing fresh empirical evidence based on firms where insiders hold a large 
fraction of the firm’s equity and their trading activity might be associated with different 
motives. The findings in this paper have important implications for two reasons. First, they 
enable us to assess whether previous findings in markets where ownership is difusse also hold 
in markets with high ownership concentration. Hence, they shed more light on how future 
stock returns are affected by the different levels of ownership. Second, they allow us to 
examine whether outside investors who mimic the trading activity of insiders can make 
profits for themselves. In connection to the above issues, we contribute to the literature in the 
following ways. 
First, although we corroborate the existing literature by finding a significantly 
negative relation between the selling activity of insiders and future stock returns (e.g., 
Seyhun, 1986), our results reveal that the relation between the buying activity of insiders and 
future stock returns is also negative. This is an interesting new finding in East Asian markets 
which is in sharp contrast to studies which focus on the US or on European markets (e.g., Lin 
and Howe, 1990; Gregory et al., 1997; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) and points to the direction 
that insiders may not always be driven by profit making motives when they purchase shares. 
To explore the issue, we group insiders into top directors and the rest of the directors and we 
show that the negative relation between the insiders’ buying activity and future stock returns 
is associated with the top directors. Furthermore, we demonstrate that top directors with 
20 
 
higher ownership levels drive this result. Consequently, our findings indicate that insiders 
who possess high levels of ownership can have different motives when they acquire their 
firm’s shares which are not always related to market timing in order to realise profits. For 
instance, their goal could be to support their own firm’s share price, or they might want to 
make a market for their firm’s shares. 
 Second, we show that a trading strategy which focuses solely on purchases made by 
top directors with low ownership levels leads to high positive returns. However, we also find 
that a similar strategy which tracks the buying activity of insiders with high ownership levels 
generates negative returns. Additionally, we find that the difference between risk-adjusted 
returns based on the Sharpe ratios obtained from the two different strategies, is also 
statistically significant. For a more comprehensive analysis, we compute the corresponding 
risk-adjusted portfolio returns (alphas) for the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, and 
Carhart four-factor model and our results remain unaffected. Therefore, our findings based on 
economic value are consistent with our statistical analysis and further strengthen our main 
conclusions. Finally, we additionally conduct a series of robustness checks which are related 
to sample selectivity and institutional characteristics, and our main conclusions do not 
change. 
Overall, this paper empirically demonstrates that the trading activity of insiders is not 
always aimed at realising profits and can be explained by their different levels of ownership. 
Hence, outside investors who mimic the buying activity of insiders should be aware of these 
issues and proceed with caution when they form trading strategies in order to time the market. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
  
Number of insider transactions Volume of insider transactions (millions of shares) 
 
All directors Top directors All directors Top directors 
Country Purchases Sales 
Purchases
Sales
  Purchases Sales 
Purchases
Sales
  Purchases Sales 
Purchases
Sales
  Purchases Sales 
Purchases
Sales
  
China 7672 1691 4.54 1756 299 5.87 58007 2538 22.86 34610 992 34.87 
Hong Kong 20162 4728 4.26 11546 1600 7.22 505892 182096 2.78 411575 151104 2.72 
India 9630 3026 3.18 3130 1025 3.05 4309 934 4.61 1864 351 5.31 
Singapore 9449 1165 8.11 4176 587 7.11 99264 29788 3.33 72513 15258 4.75 
Taiwan 19382 7541 2.57 5105 1787 2.86 182184 17330 10.51 41995 3491 12.03 
This table presents descriptive statistics over the full sample period (i.e. 2003:01-2012:05) for all markets under consideration. Specifically, we report both the total number 
and the volume of insider transactions (purchases or sales) made by all directors. We also split the sample and report the corresponding number and volume of transactions 
made by the top directors (i.e. comprised of the CEO and the Chairman of the firm). 
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Table 2. Predictive regressions based on directorsʼ trading activity.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
InsideTrade-Buy -0.013***  -0.013*** 
 (0.005)  (0.002) 
InsideTrade-Sell  -0.012** -0.012*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Size -0.566*** -0.566*** -0.566** 
 (0.023) (0.081) (0.081) 
BM -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.128*** 
 (0.016) (0.031) (0.031) 
DY 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
 (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) 
Debt/TA -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
beta 1.003*** 1.003*** 1.003*** 
 (0.102) (0.204) (0.204) 
S&P500 0.274*** 0.274** 0.274 
 (0.007) (0.130) (0.130) 
Crisis dummy -1.940*** -1.940*** -1.940*** 
 (0.051) (0.314) (0.314) 
Fixed effects Country &  
Month 
Country &  
Month 
Country &  
Month 
R2 0.030 0.038 0.038 
No of Obs. 434801 434801 434801 
This table reports predictive regressions of stock returns using the insiders’ buys and sells as predictive 
variables. The full sample spans the 2003:01-2012:05 period. The predictive regressions include a number 
of control variables: Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market equity. BM is the book-to-market 
ratio of a given firm. DY, Debt/TA and beta are, respectively, the dividend yield, debt-to-assets, and the 
firm’s market risk for a given firm. S&P500 is the return on the S&P 500 index, whereas Crisis dummy is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 from September 2007 onwards and 0 otherwise. Standard 
errors clustered both at firm and country-level are reported in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 3. Predictive regressions based on the top directorsʼ trading activity. 
 (1) (2) 
CEO Buy -0.029*** -0.029*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Chair Buy -0.268*** -0.271*** 
 (0.038) (0.035) 
Rest Buy 0.218*** 0.223*** 
 (0.061) (0.057) 
InsideTrade Sell  -0.013* 
  (0.007) 
Size -0.566*** -0.566*** 
 (0.081) (0.081) 
BM -0.128*** -0.128*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
DY 0.069*** 0.069*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Debt/TA -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
beta 1.003*** 1.003*** 
 (0.204) (0.204) 
S&P500 0.274** 0.274** 
 (0.130) (0.130) 
Crisis dummy  -1.940*** -1.940*** 
 (0.314) (0.314) 
Fixed effects Country &  
Month 
Country &  
Month 
R2 0.038 0.038 
No of Obs. 434801 434801 
This table reports predictive regressions of stock returns using top directors’ buys as a predictive 
variable. The full sample spans the 2003:01-2012:05 period. The predictive regressions include 
a number of control variables: Rest Buy denotes purchases by the rest of the directors (insiders). 
Size is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market equity. BM is the book-to-market of a given 
firm. DY, Debt/TA, and beta are, respectively, the dividend yield, debt-to-assets, and the firm’s 
market risk for a given firm. S&P500 is the return on the S&P 500 index, whereas Crisis dummy 
is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 from September 2007 onwards and 0 otherwise. 
Standard errors clustered both at the firm and country-level are reported in parentheses. 
Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
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Table 4. Predictive regressions conditioned on top directorsʼ ownership levels. 
 (1) (2) 
Top 0.081 -0.084 
 (0.055) (0.169) 
Own -0.777 -1.321 
 (1.116) (1.518) 
Perform  -0.878** 
  (0.375) 
Top * Own -0.435** 0.274 
 (0.219) (0.728) 
Top * Perform  1.399 
  (1.019) 
Own * Perform  1.109 
  (0.928) 
Top * Own * Perform  -2.699** 
  (1.166) 
Size -0.514*** -0.523*** 
 (0.141) (0.137) 
BM -0.154* -0.156* 
 (0.086) (0.087) 
DY 0.166** 0.170*** 
 (0.077) (0.076) 
Debt/TA -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
beta -0.193 -0.144 
 (0.510) (0.488) 
S&P500 0.329*** 0.320*** 
 (0.089) (0.090) 
Crisis dummy -5.039*** -5.014*** 
 (1.825) (1.779) 
Fixed effects Country &  
Month 
Country &  
Month 
R2 0.070 0.071 
No of Obs. 13989 13989 
This table reports predictive regressions of stock returns using top directors’ purchases as a 
predictive variable conditioned on their ownership level (Own) and firm’s past performance 
(Perform). The full sample spans the 2003:01-2012:05 period. The predictive regressions include a 
number of control variables: Size, BM, DY, Debt/TA, beta, S&P500, and Crisis dummy (see 
appendix for variable definitions). Standard errors clustered both at the firm and country-level are 
reported in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 5. Exploring the motives behind top directors' buying activity 
 Price support  Thin trading 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Top * Own * Perform -2.361***  -4.911**  -7.734*** 
 (0.307)  (2.198)  (0.758) 
Top * Own * Perform * EGD -8.739 ***     
 (0.763)     
Top * Own * Perform * DGD   -46.114 ***   
   (10.772)   
Top * Own * Perform * TVD     -4.795 
     (3.210) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed effects Country &  
Month 
 Country &  
Month 
 Country &  
Month 
R2 0.072  0.072  0.076 
No of Obs. 13989  13989  13989 
Column 1 reports estimates of Equation (3) extended by EGD, a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a firm’s earnings growth is positive in the previous quarter, and 0 otherwise. Column 2 
reports estimates of Equation (3) extended by DGD, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm’s dividend growth is positive in the previous quarter, and 0 otherwise. Column 3 reports 
estimates of Equation (3) extended by TVD, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
trading volume of a firm is lower than the average trading volume of the previous twelve months 
and 0 otherwise. Controls include lower order terms, as well as Size, BM, DY, Debt/TA, beta, 
S&P500 and Crisis dummy (see appendix for variable definitions). Standard errors clustered both at 
the firm and country-level are reported in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 6. Portfolio performance comparison between top directors with high and top directors with low 
ownership levels.  
 
High 
Ownership 
Low 
Ownership 
L/S 
Ownership 
Ledoit & Wolf 
(2008) test  
(p-value) 
Average returns -0.88 1.96 2.84  
Standard dev. 7.26 13.24 12.67  
Sharpe ratio -0.122 0.147  0.001 
CAPM alpha -1.58* 0.665 2.11**  
 (-1.97) (0.63) (2.39)  
Fama-French alpha -1.59* 0.87 2.32**  
 (-1.84) (0.81) (2.35)  
Carhart alpha -1.57* 1.07 2.50**  
 (-1.78) (0.93) (2.25)  
This table compares the portfolio performance of two different trading strategies over our full sample 
which spans the 2003:01-2012:05 period. The first strategy considers an investor who goes long on 
firms where their top directors have high ownership levels and show buying activity (given a negative 
past performance). If there is no buying activity from the top directors, the investor goes long on the 
risk-free asset instead. The second strategy assumes the same setup with the only difference being that 
the investor tracks the buying activity of top directors with low ownership levels. For both strategies, we 
obtain the Sharpe ratio and additionally report the corresponding risk-adjusted portfolio returns (alphas) 
for the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, and Carhart four-factor model. L/S denotes a portfolio 
strategy that goes long on low ownership buys and short on high ownership buys. Finally, we present 
the p-value of the Ledoit and Wolf (2008) statistic, which tests the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratios 
of high and low ownership portfolios are equal. The table shows results for value-weighted portfolios. t-
statistics are shown in parentheses and statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are 
indicated with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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Table 7. Robustness checks: Sample selectivity 
 Panel A: 
 Financial crisis 
Panel B: 
Firm size 
 Small firms Large firms 
InsideTrade-Buy -0.023*** -0.011*** -0.033*** 
 (0.0005) (0.002) (0.010) 
InsideTrade-Buy * Crisis Period 1 -0.130***   
 (0.055)   
InsideTrade-Buy * Crisis Period 2 -0.091   
 (0.549)   
InsideTrade-Sell -0.019*** -0.070*** 0.037** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.017) 
InsideTrade-Sell * Crisis Period 1 -0.277***   
 (0.018)   
InsideTrade-Sell * Crisis Period 2 -3.316***   
 (1.211)   
Controls YES YES YES 
Fixed effects Country &  
Month 
Country &  
Month 
Country &  
Month 
R2 0.049 0.046 0.047 
No of Obs. 434801 144932 144933 
This table reports predictive regressions of stock returns using the insiders’ buys and sells as predictive 
variables. The full sample spans the 2003:01-2012:05 period. Panel A looks into the effect of the recent 
global financial crisis on our results. Crisis Period 1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 between 
September 2007 (the Nothern Rock bank run) and August 2008, and 0 otherwise. Crisis Period 2 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 between September 2008 (the Lehman Brothers collapse) and 
January 2009, and 0 otherwise. Panel B explores whether our results are driven by small or large firms. 
Firms that belong to the lower tertile (in terms of size) of our sample are classified as small, while those 
that belong to the top tertile are classified as large. Controls include the following variables: Size, BM, DY, 
Debt/TA, beta, S&P500, and Crisis dummy which is included only in Panel B (see appendix for variable 
definitions). Standard errors clustered both at the firm and country-level are reported in parentheses. 
Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 8. Robustness checks: Institutional characteristics 
Top 0.164*** 
 (0.060) 
Own -1.058*** 
 (0.340) 
Perform 0.369* 
 (0.210) 
Top * Own -0.772*** 
 (0.262) 
Top * Perform 0.577* 
 (0.337) 
Own * Perform 0.787 
 (0.715) 
Top * Own * Perform -2.910*** 
 (0.564) 
Size -0.292*** 
 (0.111) 
BM -0.108** 
 (0.048) 
DY 0.112*** 
 (0.033) 
Volume  
  
Debt/TA -0.015** 
 (0.007) 
beta -0.158 
 (0.709) 
S&P500 0.328*** 
 (0.108) 
Crisis dummy -5.687*** 
 (2.046) 
Fixed effects Country x Month 
R2 0.273 
No of Obs. 434801 
This table reports predictive regressions of stock returns using top directors’ purchases as a 
predictive variable conditioned on their ownership level (Own) and firm’s past performance 
(Perform) and including month-country fixed effects to capture any time varying institutional 
characteristics. The full sample spans the 2003:01-2012:05 period. The predictive regressions 
include a number of control variables: Size, BM, DY, Debt/TA, beta, S&P500, and Crisis dummy 
(see appendix for variable definitions). Standard errors clustered both at the firm and country-level 
are reported in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9. Robustness checks: Blackout periods 
 All directors  Top directors 
 (1)  (2) 
CEO Buy -0.030***   
 (0.003)   
Chair Buy -0.246***   
 (0.068)   
Rest Buy 0.203**   
 (0.089)   
Top * Own * Perform   1.728 
   (1.430) 
CEO Buy * Blackout 0.947*   
 (0.516)   
Chair Buy * Blackout 4.308***   
 (0.071)   
Rest Buy * Blackout 0.136   
 (0.879)   
Top * Own * Perform * Blackout   -109.762 *** 
   (35.458) 
Blackout 0.774***  -1.957** 
 (0.264)  (0.869) 
Other variables Yes  Yes 
Fixed effects Country &  
Month 
 Country &  
Month 
R2 0.041  0.076 
No of Obs. 393034  12544 
This table reports predictive regressions of stock returns using insiders’ (All directors and Top 
directors respectively) purchases as a predictive variable conditional on whether purchases take 
place during a blackout period or not. The blackout period is captured by a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 during the month preceding earnings announcement and 0 otherwise. The 
predictive regressions also include a number of other control variables: Size, BM, DY, Debt/TA, 
beta, S&P500, and Crisis dummy (see appendix for variable definitions). Standard errors clustered 
both at the firm and country-level are reported in parentheses. Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix  
Table A.1 Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
𝑅 Firm’s monthly stock returns  DataStream 
InsideTrade-
Buy 
Insiders’ buying activity expressed in millions of 
shares 
DataStream 
InsideTrade-
Sell 
Insiders’ selling activity expressed in millions of 
shares 
DataStream 
CEO Buy Buying activity of CEO expressed in millions of 
shares 
DataStream 
Chair Buy Buying activity of Chair expressed in millions of 
shares 
DataStream 
Rest Buy Combined buying activity of the rest of firm’s 
directors expressed in millions of shares 
DataStream 
Top  Combined buying activity of CEO and Chair 
expressed in millions of shares 
DataStream 
Perform A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
firm’s return in the previous period is negative, and 
zero otherwise 
DataStream 
Own  Combined ownership level of CEO and Chair  DataStream 
Size Logarithm of firm’s market valuation DataStream 
BM Book-to-market ratio DataStream 
DY Dividend yield DataStream 
Volume Logarithm of the number of shares traded for a stock 
in a month 
DataStream 
Debt/TA Debt-to-total assets ratio DataStream 
beta  The company’s beta  DataStream 
S&P500 Return on the S&P 500 index DataStream 
Crisis dummy A dummy variable that takes the value one from 
September 2007 onwards and zero otherwise 
Own calculations 
Crisis Period 1 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 between 
September 2007 and August 2008, and 0 otherwise 
Own calculations 
Crisis Period 2 A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 between 
September 2008 and January 2009, and 0 otherwise 
Own calculations 
EGD A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm’s earnings growth is positive in the previous 
quarter, and 0 otherwise 
DataStream and 
own calculations 
DVD A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm’s dividend growth is positive in the previous 
quarter, and 0 otherwise 
DataStream and 
own calculations 
TVD A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
trading volume of a firm is lower than the average 
trading volume of the previous twelve months and 0 
otherwise 
DataStream and 
own calculations 
Blackout A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm’s earnings are announced in the following 
month and 0 otherwise. 
DataStream and 
own calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
